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INTRODUCTION 
Under the Common Law, owners of business establishments possess 
certain freedoms of action, incidental to their legal status, which are 
commonly called management prerogatives, management rights, or are 
referred to generically as 'the right to manage'. The concept has been 
operationalized as "management's right to make the decisions and take 
the actions necessary to discharge the responsibility of conducting· 
their enterprise. 111 
This paper aims to test the proposition that "there are actions 
or areas for action so essential to management that these must unilaterally 
remain the property of management if management itself is to exist".
2 
It aims at analysing selected areas of 'the right to manage' and to 
examine how it remains extant, in fact, and in theory. 
2 
MANAGEMENT 
Management is an abstract concept. It may be an association of 
employers, a private employer, a company, a firm. It may be a local 
authority or the state itself. Principally, it denotes an activity -
to "plan and to regulate production and distribution, to co-ordinate 
capital and labour on the one hand, the activity to produce an to 
distribute on the other. 113 "Labour" too is an abstraction, and it 
is often not possible to separate it from "management". For instance, 
a production manager is "management" if seen from below and "labour" 
if seen from above. Such a phenomenon is an inevitable consequence 
of the growth of the units of enterprise and the separation of an 
organisation into a vertical conglomeration of specialists - accountants, 
personnel managers and so on, where decisions are based on the 
strength of agglomerative collegial decision. 
The work of Fogelberg and Greatorex
4 
has resulted in a profile 
of the 'typical' New Zealand manager. His average age is 51 year3, 
commencing employment at age 18 and becoming an executive director 
at age 39. There are one in two chances that his father was a 
business manager similarly professionally oriented, and an equ a l 
likelihood pis wife's father was in a similar position. One in four 
managers have university degrees and most have worked for no more than 
two companies. When these men commenced full time employment. less 
than 10% of the New Zealand workforce was in this occupational 
classification. Most of them achieved success at an early age. The 
notion of an 'average manager' then, may have utility in it beyond 
mere rhetoric. 
Management prerogatives tend to be self justified by claiming that 
the qualities needed to rise to high positions in the corporate 
structure are indicators of competence and business acumen. There is 
also a moral assumption that rule making should attach to management, 
and whilst not specifically justifying their rights vis-a-vis workers, 
(there are exceptions, for example, the incorporation of "reserved 
rights" of management in the Motor Holdings Limited Ports Warehouse 
3 
of 
Employees Collective Agreement), 
5 
they imply that maximization of 
managerial goals maximizes workers well-being. In any case, there 
are responsibilities that are claimed to be peculiar to the realm 
management . First and foremost is management's responsibility to 
the shareholders (owners) to operate the business in an efficient 
and profitable manner. Secondly, management has the responsibility 
to consumers to produce a useable , safe, and realistically priced 
product. Thirdly, management has the responsibility to employees 
to provide continued employment of safe jobs with the best possible 
wages and working conditions which are consistent with the first two 
responsibilities. 
The theoretical underpinning of this justification is centred 
around the concept of property, and so this concept needs elaboration 
to determine the legitimacy of the right to manage. 
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PROPERTY 
Ancient Rome did not have laws regarding the master-servant 
relationship, because the servant was regarded in the same light as 
the master's chattels. This view changed very little in the days of 
the Industrial Revolution. T.H. Green reflects the classic liberal 
view as: 
"This shall be mine to do as I like with, to satisfy my 
wants and express my emotions as they arise." 6 
Property was 'natural' because it was the external means of 
realizing and expressing that inner, free, and rational will "which 
is the distinguishing mark of man vis-a-vis other animals." So, 
nineteenth century economic thought was grounded in a laissez-faire 
philosophy: trade was to be free and uninhibited, price s were to be 
determined by the interaction to the most productive enterprises. 
The business enterprise was the creation of man's labour, effort and 
other resources. It was imbued with his personality and was in effect 
an extention of his persona. So, just as a man had control rights ove r 
his own body, so he had control rights in his property; to allocate; 
to produce; to manage how he perceived they should be. Since he took 
7 
risks, he should be entitled to any reward. 
But business organisation goe s hand in hand with technical advance. 
To make capital effective there was a greater gestation period betwe en 
the time of the initial investment and the final emeYge nce of auseab l e 
product. This inner logic led to the creation of the Joint Stock 
Company, and with it a clear separation between ownership and manageme nt. 
Therefore it is a crude assumption that all employers, in the sense of 
ownership of capital invested actually takes the risks of the 
enterprise. An actual distinction must then be maintained between the 
small privately owned company and its larger counterparts. 
Total Number Employed 
Under 5 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-599 600-1000 1000 
and 
over 
Percentage of 
total 
establishments 
22.3 28.9 20.4 16.8 
Source: Census of Manufacturing 1978-79. 
6.1 4.9 0.3 0.2 
5 
The figures indicate that the small enterprise has not disappeared 
but consolidation toward the medium to large unit is typical of the 
economy. It is encouraged not only by the state who exhort the 
need for more inputs to cater for the overseas market and less 
emphasis on small scale production for the domestic market, but also 
by the producers themselves, who view monopoly situations as countering 
the vagaries of the domestic market. The analysis of the legal 
status of enterprises demonstrates the extent of the ownership/management 
separation. 
No. 
Individual Ownership 576 
Partnership 562 
Private Company 8 594 
Public Company 563 
Co-operative 
Association 158 
Central Government 30 
Local Government 32 
Other 5 
TOTAL 10 520 
Source: Census of Manufacturing 
Persons 
Employed 
3 125 
3 767 
115 924 
53 327 
11 063 
9 230 
728 
167 
298 331 
1978-79 
Turnover 
$ (OOO) 
51,198 
76,653 
550,239 
2,199,291 
839,514 
184,021 
23,221 
1,545 
10,925,685 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Minus Disposals 
$(000) 
2,031 
3,437 
305,885 
100,676 
51,469 
8,100 
3,263 
44 
474,902 
As t~e company (and therefore the management) expands the 
shareholders' exercise of shareholding rights dissipates. A stage 
is reached when: · 
" ... the typical shareholder ... is not knowledgeable about the 
business of the firm, does not derive an important part of 
his livelihood from it, and neither expects nor has an 
incentive to participate in the management of the firm. 
He is a passive investor ... " 8 
What has occurred in the latter part of this century is the 
transference of the employer's prerogatives to management, but without 
the employer's property incentive and individual initiative in private 
enterprise that was assumed to justify the employer's right,not only 
to trade freely but to be free from the constraints which labour sought 
to impose on the mobility of his resources. Power has been transferred 
without property. 
6 
Management, it is true, is ultimately accountable to the board 
of directors, but a survey by G. Fogelberg of New Zealand's twelve 
largest companies, each company having been involved in at least one 
takeover in the period 1962-74 concluded, inter alia. 
(1) that "contrary to popular belief" directors of the large companies 
have a negligible ownership interest in the company (the aggregate 
holding of the directors in the companies surveyed amounting to 
only 1.2% of the total capital); 
(2) that with the increasing dispersion of shareownership shareholders 
as a group "cannot influence the direction of their company"; 
(3) that only the large corporate investors, either individually or 
collectively, can assert influence over the company's decisions; 
(4) that these developments are consistent with trends observed in 
h 
. 9 ot er countries. 
Now if the composition of the board of directors is typically 
reflective of the pattern of ownership then accountability to the 
board renders any perspective on the separation of ownership from 
management more apparent than real. However, to the extent that such 
accountability is absent and the above figures suggest that accountability 
is to people other than owners of the company, the concept of residual 
10 management rights is weakened. 
However, management rights may be legitimized by a new 
perspective on property, one that focuses on the role of the state 
and the boundaries between the private and the public domain, and 
(;:Specially the extent to which the state impinges on private industry. 
This relationship views the state in three broad roles: 
(1) The State as Developer 
Strictly speaking there is no such thing as a laissez-faire 
capitalist state. At the minimum the state always facilitates the 
activity of private industry. By means of subsidies and grants 
the Government can encourage enterprises and developments in certain areas. 
7 
1 d h . . 11 h In New Zea an at t e Turning Point t e Task Force noted that 
government, in devising a strategy for the future could take the 
part of "selective administrative intervention". This meant trying 
to "pick the winners" as between sectors and industries and encouraging 
chosen industries to re-organize and rationalize where this would 
contribute to wider economic and social development. Similarly, 
within the current CER regime there are provisions for the 
"rationalization" of industry to meet the obligations of the new 
. . . 12 competitive regime. 
The most pervasive example of state intervention is in its 
protection policy, especially import licensing and tariffs. Originally 
introduced to provide for equitable distribution of limited foreign 
exchange they have been retained to give protection to local industries 
and promote employment by redistributing income in favour of labour. 
Being insulated the protected sector tends to have less incentive 
to innovate and technical change is thwarted. 
Artifically created industries have tended to develop outside 
spheres of comparative advantage and rely on government assistance for 
their continued existence. The Motor Industry, because of its size 
is the most pertinent example. It has been estimated that it costs 
$7.35 of domestically owned resources to save $1 of foreign exchange 
13 by assembling a Japanese 1300 cc car in New Zealand. The heavy 
public investment must be traded off with the jobs created but it is 
inevitable when Government talks of "restructuring" such industries, 
management has little choice but to acquiesce. 
Finally, the farming and fishing industries benefit from direct 
subsidies of development costs to assist with capital costs and 
equipment. In addition, the state itself is involved in exploration 
and development, either alone or in partnership with private industry, 
with, in turn, many other industries geared to producing inputs for 
these state funded projects. 
8 
(II) The State as a Regulatory Body 
The state can regulate and control the entry of individuals and 
firms into certain economic activities by requiring those activities 
to be pursued only by holders of an appropriate licence. For example, 
the Air Services Licensing Act 1951 makes it unlawful to carry on any 
air services in New Zealand other than pursuant to a licence issued 
by the Air Services Licensing Authority. In addition, Trade qualifications 
and examination standards are conducted through Education Board 
authorities like the TCA. Under the Apprenticeship Act, the number of 
apprentices an employer can take is governed by an apprenticeship 
ratio, that is, a number of apprentices as a proportion of the number 
of tradesmen engaged. Each application for a contract is treated as 
a separate transaction in its own right, even if the employer has an 
established record in training apprentices, though a Bill at the time 
of writing currently before Parliament would enable an employer to 
take on apprentices to his own perceived maximum capabilities, and would 
not set any quantitative limits. 
The Department of Labour runs PEP schemes of subsidized labour, 
provides information both to employees of the job market situation 
and to employees via a job screening and placement service. In 
1982-83, 240 OOO employees passed through the Department's books and 
into private employment . If a firm 'creates' a job in addition to 
the number of people currently employed and to the average number of 
employees during the past year it can claim a $65 per week subsidy, and 
if it is a small firm it may be eligible for a job suspensory loan. 
Subsidies are also paid for adult training and employing disabled 
14 
people. 
( III) Direct Statist Intervention 
Statistintervention into the industrial relations area is not 
new. In 1908-13 when unions voluntarily deregistered themselves and 
bargained with management outside the procedures of conciliation and 
arbitration, the government, through an adjustment to the formal rules 
9 
prevented the unions operating independently of the fonnal system. 
During World War 2 manpower planning directed labour to war related 
industries. Indeed, blanket coverage of awards may be seen as a fonn 
of state intervention. What is new, is the direct statist intervention 
in the role of management itself. 
The first example arose during the 1977/78 award rounds and 
concerned a key trendsetting award, the Electrical Workers Award. 
In conciliation, the unions agreed to an increase of 9.4% but the next 
day, under prompting from the Ministers of Labour and Energy, the 
employers withdrew their offer. Eventually an increase of 7.4% in 
Auckland and 9.4% elsewhere was agreed to. Later in the year the 
Prime Minister and Freezing Worker unions met whilst conciliation was 
still in progress over the Freezing Workers Award. Regulations 
were promulgated with the state subsidizing wages to the tune of 
$3 million, with the unions to drop claims amounting to that sum, and 
the company involved to absorb the amounts. 
In 1979 the Remuneration Act was passed which enabled the 
government to control both wages and conditions of employment and 
was justif,ied by a Financial Statement in June of that year: 
"The Government will not stand by and see our prospects for growth 
in output and employment damaged by excessive wage settlements which 
could boost inflation, discourage investment, increase unemployment 
• • • II 15 and make it harder to raise real rather than money incomes. 
Employers in principle supported the state's 'right' to prevent 
excessive wage settlements, though the Employers Federation warned 
that they should not be innocent victims of the applications of the 
Act and should be consulted before regulations were promulgated. 
In fact, the four times the Act was used or threatened, this plea was 
16 ignored. The Remuneration Act was repealed after a disastrous 
intervention in the Kinleith wage settlement of 1980 when a well 
prepared union, combined with employer recalcitrance, exposed the 
New Zealand government to its first public defeat in modern industrial 
relations history. 
10 
State power is the motivating force behind key wage settlements 
where union and management together cannot offer viable alternatives. 
Research indicates that wages have doubled in the last four years 
while the Consumer Price Index has increased by 78% su9gesting that 
overvalued real wage rates are a major cause of New Zealand's current 
unemployment and this can be largely linked to power bargaining. 
Monetary and fiscal policies can only arrest the upward wage and price 
spiral by arresting expansion and growth, and hence employment, so the 
Government has resorted to incomes policies as an economic tool. 
Between 1971-77 a regime of Remuneration Authority, Wages Tribunal, 
Industrial Commission, and Wage Hearing Tribunal was established with 
the responsibility of approving all increases in remuneration contained 
in an instrument. In 1976 the Wage Adjustment Regulations provided 
that there was to be no increase in remuneration permitted unless 
union and management agreed on exceptional circumstances. The Wage 
Freeze Regulations 1982 put a ceiling on salaries and wages and 
paralyzed the dispute of interest procedure (and all negotiations in 
the nature of a dispute of interest), with the specific aim of 
restoring stability to the economy. 
The 'New Property' and the Right to Manage 
The term 'new property' was coined by C. Reich 
17 
after observing 
that the link between property and the human personality consists of 
the role of property as a buffer between individual and the State. 
At an individual level to control one's wealth is to have a degree 
of personal autonomy, and to forfeit such control is to forfeit 
autonomy. Multi-ownership of corporations has helped to separate 
personality from property and property from the power it wields. When 
the corporations began to stop competing, to merge, agree and make 
mutual plans, they become private governments. They have sought the 
aid and partnership of the State, and thus by their own volition have 
become part of a quasi-public government. Where this volition was not 
forthcoming the State has seized it for itself, or else ensured that 
a firm's wealth and administration is so bound up in the State, that 
any formal expression of union is otiose. 
11 
Individual firms are now accountable to the State who thus have 
a quasi-property interest in the firm and this grants the State the 
legitimacy to control manageme nt. Autonomy has been surrende red and 
rightsthat do exist are dependant on the large sse of the State. 
This does not imply State ownership of property. In fact, the, 
State is desirous of maintaining private owne rship, but at the same 
time subjecting industry to a capitalist discipline. It thus subjects 
industry to a 'corporatist' scheme of laws which are underpinne d by 
the following five themes. 
1) Directive State Interve ntion. The conciliation and a r b itra tion s y s t e m 
is modified and maintained in accordance with changing p e rceptions 
of State interest. 
2) Unity. Economic goals are argued to be b e st achieved by co-operative 
effort rather than by compe titive proce sses. 
3) Order. The State must orde r the relationships b e twe en partie s 
to forestall any potential destabilizing influe nce s in the system. 
4) Nationalism. The national good is preserved by deline ating 
certain rights in particular groups. 
5) Success. h b 11 d . d 18 Te system is a ove a an en s-oriente system. 
This framework involves the filtering and transformation of 
customs and work rules to the status of legal norms, and the supervision 
of the exercise of managerial prerogative by legal institutions 
associated with the State. Recognizing the inevitability of conflict, 
the State is deliberately stepping in to stabilize industry and 
depoliticise conflict. How the right to manage is manifested within 
a state regulatory framework will be examined by discussing various 
aspects of claimed management rights and how these rights have been 
interpreted through the 'neutral' agency of the Court system. 
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MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 
(A) The Right to Bargain 
The legal basis of the employment relationship is the contract 
of service, though this bears little resemblance to the nineteenth 
century instrument which viewed a contract as a voluntary bargain, 
the terms of which were agreed by a free bargain between two citizens 
equal in law. In fact the concept has been vilified as another name 
for "freedom of coercion", a comment on the gross inequality of 
bargaining power on the side of the employer, and is seen by many as 
providing ineffective protection for workers. The contents of the 
modern contract of employment have largely been pre-determined by 
a collective instrument and by mandatory legislative rules that are 
incorporated into the contract. 'Free will' or consensus is only 
relevant at the time of the formation of the contract but still remains 
a basic prerequisite in forming and in ending the service compact, 
notwithstanding that the will of one party in certain circumstar.ces 
may be negated by superimposed legal norms. The rule in Felthouse v 
Bird~ 
19 
may afford some protection by requiring some positive act 
of acceptance but it must be realised that acceptance of the contract of 
employmen\ is normally not much more than a matter of sile nt 
acquiesence in the terms stated by the employer. 
Retention of the contract concept, both academically and in 
practice provides flexibility in maintaining management rights. At 
common law an employers' unilateral action is viewed largely in terms 
of nature of the substantive terms of the individual employee's contract 
of employment, that is, the type of job, its status, its level of pay, 
and the place of work. Where an employee acquiesces in such a change 
he may be viewed in contractual terms as having consensually varied 
his employment contract. It is interesting to note that the application 
of the test of consensual variation at common law often consists of an 
examination of whether the employee had knowledge of the change and 
rarely concerns itself with the question of whether in fact the employee 
had agreed to the change. (Marshall v English Electric Co. Ltd). 
20 
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If an employer insists on the employee working under new contractual 
terms and upon refusal is dismissed, the employee would have a valid 
claim for unjustifiable dismissal (infra). Where there is a non-repudiatory 
unilateral change introduced by management there is an implied common 
law obligation to work to the change. Common law provides support for 
management to change working conditions without prior consultation. 
An award incorporated into a contract provides a minimum so that 
there is opportunity, for example, for an employee to bargain for 
higher wages than that prescribed by the award, but he may not make 
a bargain for lower wages in violation of the terms of the award. 
Such informal bargaining has been historically quite common and is 
warmly looked at by unionists pining for the halcyondays when 30% above 
award rates were the norm in New Zealand. The Industrial Relations 
Act has attempted to curb this by calling all such bargains "collective 
instruments" and, bys. 65, making them registrable, yet there are no 
sanctions for failing to register it. Voluntary collective bargaining 
(paralyzed by the current Wage Freeze Regulations 1982) has been 
used to great advantage by managemen t. A voluntary collective agreement 
prevails over any award where this an inconsistency between the two 
documents and in the case of Inspector of Awards v. De Luxe Motor 
21 Services (1942) Ltd. The Court suggests: "There does not seem to be 
any obstacle to reach an agreement reducing wage rates or bargaining 
conditions". This writer is unaware of any case that has tested this 
proposition but can point to developments such as a code of practice as 
outlined in the Hutt Valley and Porirua Basin Motor Assembly Plant 
Employees Agreement which outlined the rights and obligations of both 
unions and employers. Another interesting idea is found in the 
Kinleith Site Contractors Boilermakers Agreement. Appendix 1 deals 
with example of particular redundancy situations and whether workers 
so affected may qualify for redundancy payments and in what form. 
Where an award or collective agreement is silent on any issue 
the Court subscribes to the "living document" thesis in that an 
instrument is not a static, restrictive document, but rather a dynamic 
set of ground rules that can be added to as the need occurs. The 
language of the dispute of rights procedure contained ins. 116 
14 
of the Industrial Relations Act provides this flexibility in that it is 
" ... related to matters dealt with in [the] instrument and not 
specifically and clearly disposed of by the terms of [the] instrument" and 
the AHI v North Island Electrical Etc ... IUW 
22 
case interpreted this 
section to include terms and conditions not even mentioned in the 
instrument. A "quick in - quick out" nature of money negotiations often 
reflectsinadequate planning and insufficient coverage of problems of 
working and non-economic conditions, no doubt mainly because most 
formal bargaining takes place with a September/October to February/March 
wage round with pressure to settle documents as quickly as possible. 
The principal difficulty facing employers is the established 
pattern of wage relativities which "impose a straightjacket by not 
allowing individual industry or company capacity to pay factors to 
be reflected in wage settlements, and by virtually eliminating the 
possibility of changing job content or responsibilities to be reflected 
23 
in changing internal ... relativities." The Artibration Court 
inevitably preserves relativities as providing some sort of certainty 
which both parties make allowances for. In the 1981-82 award round, 
78% of national settlements showed a rise of between 9.5% and 10.5%, 
while only 11% were outside the range of 9.5% to 12%. 
Most pay rates are therefore largely determined by ratios 
outside their own· industries. Rigid relativities restrict the mobility 
of labour by preventing rates rising enough to attract labour to 
expanding industries. Above award rates of pay only go a limited way 
in ameliorating the problem. As a result, an ad hoe and unstructured 
bargaining structure has developed outside formal bargaining procedures 
and without formal dispute resolution mechanisms. However, even these 
negotiations are stultified by the occupationally based bargaining 
system. Employers have long called for a movement to industry based 
bargaining or bargaining centred on groupings of like industries, and 
point to demarcation infighting amongst the unions themselves as proof 
of the inherent inefficienty in the traditional system. 
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However, employers have material advantages in wage negotiation. 
For instance, the 'right' to strike is a modern bargaining tool, 
yet the 'right' has not been recognized in New Zealand, and strikes 
have been severely limited by Part IX of the Industrial Relations 
Act with regard to notice and penalty provisions, and a wide definition 
range of what constitutes a strike. Section 81 of the Act prohibits 
any discontinuation of the employment relationship, strike or lockout 
until the dispute has been finally disposed of by the the Conciliation 
Council or the Arbitration Court. As a result, workers who are unable 
to withdraw their labour have their bargaining power severely limited. 
It may be mentioned that the definition of "lockout" under s. 124 
of the Act is much narrower than that of "strike" as it must occur 
"with a view" to compelling compliance to the employer's demands or to 
the terms of the contract. This makes it easier for the employer to take 
himself out of the section for instance by claiming, as was rece ntly 
done, that the "lockout" was instigated to ensure FoL involveme nt, and 
hence was not a "lockout" by the terms of the section. 
24 
Management 
rights are therefore upheld by indirect means which limit scope for unions 
to impose their will on management. - rt is the result of state largesse 
rather than being intrinsic in the right to manage for by limiting an 
opposing group's right one does not enlarge or validate ones own right, 
but simply give it more scope for expression. 
Having control over information is also a strong weapon in maintaining 
the right to manage. In a collective bargaining framework, the party 
with a monopoly on information has a distinct advantage when the 
question of 'ability to pay' versus 'willingness to pay' is an 
important factor in wage rounds. The Industrial Relations Act upholds 
managerial prerogative in this respect. Section 77(ii) states that 
"In Conciliation Council, no person is bound to give evidence with 
regard to trade secrets, profits, losses, receipts or outgoings in 
his business, or in respect of his financial position or to produce 
books kept by him in connection with his business." It then seems that 
unions can only rely on any or all of: 
1) Information disclosed by formal agreement with the company, 
2) Information disclosed in the course of bargaining, 
-----~~-
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3) Stolen information, in which case the officials are liable to be 
exposed to legal action as in Bents Brewery Co. Ltd v Hogan 
25 
4) If a public company, annual reports and prospectuses issued in 
d . h h . 26 accor ance wit t e Companies Act. 
It is clear then that great lassitude is granted by the State 
in the area of negotiations with management apparently in the 
preferrable position. Yet despite these inherent advantages collective 
bargaining is said to be "the very mechanism by which organized workers 
27 
may achieve control and exercise it jointly with management" , and 
again, "The primary mechanism by which unions may share managerial 
authority in the corporation is collective bargaining, including both 
contract negotiations and grievance procedures supported by the power 
of the strike." 
28 
Management has been cautioned that the invasion of its rights 
through collective bargaining may be more far reaching than appears 
on the surface and that its rights are often given away unwittingly. 
Economist S.H. Glichter:
2911
In actual bargaining, the working 
rules of trade unions are built up gradually, one or two at a 
time. This leads to atomistic consideration of their effects, 
which may cause their effects as a whole to be overlooked." 
. 30 . f . Arner:i,can Attorney R. Abelow "Rights are o ten given 
away - not taken away. Employers frequently negotiate 
away their responsibilities by accepting prpposals which 
at the time seem innocuous or not immediately harmful. 
Being mainly concerned with the immediate problems at hand, 
employers are prone to make concessions on proposals, the 
effect of which they do not forsee, or if they do, seem 
too far off to worry about." 
Whether the union succeeds in picking away at trivial rights 
such as opening times of the firm's cafeteria, or more substantial 
rights such as the right to hire (see infra) will _depend primarily 
on the strength of the union negotiating. However, if the enterprise 
occupies a prominent position in the economy the state is bound to 
intervene to directly upheld management rights in the name of public 
interest Itleads one to enquire whether rights which cannot be upheld 
other than by state power are rights at all, and this question will be 
addressed at the conclusion of the paper. 
17 
(B) The Right to Hire 
The Corrunon Law enabled the employer to disregard for hire any 
person, no matter how capricious or repugnant were his reasons. 
This generally remains the case though there are two major statutory 
exceptions which colour the 'right' by limiting some of its arbitrary 
31 
nature. 
(1) Antidiscrimination Legislation 
The combined effect of the Human Rights Corrunission Act 1977 and 
the Race Relations Act 1971 declares unlawful the refusal to employ 
or to give equal terms and opportunities when employed; and dismissal 
or d etriment in employment in circumstances in which other people , equally 
qualified are not so treated or are given better terms and opportunities, 
and such unequal treatment is by reason of the sex, marital status, or 
religious or ethical belief, or colour, race, or ethnic or national 
origin of that person . In Human Rights Commission v Eric Sides 
32 
it 
was held that the phrase "by reason of" meant that the factor prohibited 
by the legislation must be a 'substantial and operative' one in the 
decision. In the Sides case the Equal Opportunities Tribunal held 
that thou~h a religious issue was a factor in the defendant's refusal 
to hire the plaintiff, within the totality of reasons the application 
for a job was primarily· refused because of the unfavourable impression 
the plaintiff conveyed during his interview. There is a statutory 
onus of proof placed on the plaintiff - the balance of probabilities 
standard - and the defendant is entitled to any benefit of the doubt. 
Mr Sides and his co-defendants however, lost their case on the 
ground that newspaper advertisements for a" ... keen Christian 
person ... " breached s. 32 of the Human Rights Corrunission Act in that, to 
the "reasonable person", the advertisements were, or could be 
understood as being, discriminatory. The reaction to the case, not only 
by employers but also by the general public was unparalleled. In the 
wake of the controversy amendments were made to the offending s. 15 
bys. 2 of the Human Rights Corrunission Act 1981 permitting 
preferential treatment based on particularity of religious or ethical 
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belief between coherents of that belief and the special circumstances 
of the particular job that make such preference reasonable. These 
changes were made to ostensibly cure similar situations to that which 
Mr Sides found himself in, yet it has been submitted by one writer 
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that the facts of the Sides case would be decided no differently if the 
new criteria was imposed. Notably, it is not "reasonable" for solely 
a Christian to be able to tend a petrol pump, to the exclusion of 
other non-believers in the same way as it is "reasonable" for a 
Roman Catholic teacher to be preferred in a Roman Catholic school. The 
Amendment can be viewed as a political sop to misguided public opinions, 
(it being an election year) and in no way an attenuation of the Act's 
basic aims. 
"D.iscrimination" is permitted under s. 15 of the Human Rights 
Commission Act where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification, 
for example in modelling (s. 15(3) (a)) or where sensibilities or 
dignity are under threat, for example, a lavatory attendant (s. 15(3) (c)), 
and in domestic employment in a private household, with regard to sex and 
marital status, where a position requires a married couple or where 
separate facilities are impractical. A strange preferential treatment 
provision occurs in the s. 5(3) of the Race. Relations Act concerning 
persons of,a particular ethnic or national origin who have or are 
commonly found to have a particular qualification or aptitudP... It is 
stated in positive terms but can it be said that Europeans have a 
special skill in professional positions? These provisions may provide 
an opportunity for some employers to usurp the legislation, yet the 
Arbitration Court in other areas has stressed its ability to look 
behind "form" and this may thus negate any such avoidance technicalities . 
The employer may not claim that he simply complied with the terms 
of his relevant award, if any of these terms infringed the legislation 
( . h . . h . ) 34 Human Rig ts Commission v Ocean Beac Freezing Co. However, the 
damages for non-observance of the Act do not appear to be onerous. In 
the Ocean Beach case ( supra) women on a slaughter gang who were denied 
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positions to men of less seniority were granted damages in respect of 
pecuniary loss and expenses (s. 5 of the Human Rights Corrunission Act) 
but for damages relating to "humiliation, loss of dignity and injury 
to feelings" (which may not exceed $1,000; s. 40(1) (c)) the Tribunal 
was cautious because such allegations are easy to make but hard to 
rebut, much depending on the truthfullness of the person concerned. 
An order under s. 38(6) (b) was made to restrict the defendant from 
repeating the breach. It may be noted that in the U.S.A., companies 
have to produce evidence of policies of non discrimination (with tough 
sanctions for failing to do so),and job tests and interview criteria 
that have an adverse effect on a minority grouprave to be proved to be 
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job related. 
At an optimistic level, antidiscrimination legislation is 
symptomatic of a wider humanitarian ethos where employers are merely 
seen as part, albeit an important p art, of the wider p ublic, and the 
legislation is imbued with an aim of achieving 'social justice' for 
victims of discrimination. Negative attitudes and stereotypes are 
are purposively desired to be eliminated. It necessarily impinges on 
the right to hire whosoever an employer pleases, but then this is a 
small price to pay for being a member of the corrunw1ity. In any case 
no enterprise can afford to not employ skilled employees simply on a 
whim of prejudice, so the legislation in fact may positively aid an 
enterprise. Modern technology, as noted in the Ocean Be ach case (supra) 
is also reducing "physical aspects" of many jobs, and with it, plausible 
exclusionary excuses for women. 
A more cynical, and, it is submitted, a more accurate view is 
that the legislation with respect to the employment situation) is a 
paper tiger, more attuned to fulfilling the government's international 
obligations than to industrial realities. ThP.cearth of cases on point 
highlight the problems of proving discriminatory motives in the hiring 
process, and the publicity given to the Sides case would no doubt make 
any employer wary about manifesting discriminatory motives in front 
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of a potential employee. P. Spoonley in a survey of 40 Auckland 
employers found that 62% of the respondents indicated, in open ended 
interviews, they would prefer not to employ Pacific Islanders. In 
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matched applications, even when the Pakeha was less qualified, a 
Niuean applicant was still offered 24% fewer interviews and a Maori 
applicant 20% fewer interviews. It is submitted that such discriminatory 
practices could be explained away by a wily manager by reference to 
legitimate hiring criteria, for example appearance, speech habits, 
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manners and so on. In any case, it is submitted that many job 
applicants, especially Pacific Islanders who are relatively new to 
the country, have little or no knowledge of their exact rights under 
the legislation, and if they do many would be too cynical of wasting 
their time and effort in following them up. Perhaps the legislation's 
greatest merit is in forcing managers to review hiring criteria and 
reassess their own prejudices and judgments to the extent that eventually 
such legislation will become unne c e ssary. 
(2) Unqualified Preference Clause 
If an unqualified preference clause is inserted in an award a 
union may request a worker to join that union and the worker must 
comply within 14 days of that request. If the employee still refuses 
to join he must be dismissed, and an employer will be proceeded against 
for breach of an award if he continues to employ the recalcitrant worker 
unless an exemption from membership is granted on conscientious grounds. 
This has been variously described as "union shop", "post-entry closed 
shop", and "state negotiated compulsory union membership" and has 
prompted one prominent union official, Pat Kelly, to exclaim "[the 
union] has just as much say as he who will be employed and who will 
not be employed as the manager has. The absolute right to hire and 
fire does not apply in the Trade Union movement." 
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The Kelly claim may be exaggerated for New Zealand certainly does 
not approach the "pre-entry closed shop" which involves some 17% 
of United Kingdom workers and where the union has an absolute say as 
to who they admit into their union. Bys. 104 of the Industrial Relations 
Act a New Zealand union can only refuse admission to a person of 
"general bad character'' and any inconsistency in union rules are null 
and void. Discriminatory provisions are subject to the Hwnan Rights 
Commission Act. 
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By virtue of s. 98A(l) of the Industrial Relations Act "No member 
of a union shall be entitled to preference in obtaining employment for 
any work by virtue of his membership of that union." In its recent 
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JV II decisions it was demonstrated that the Court strictly 
observes this section. Evidence in the case that the Boilermakers 
Union had refused membership to certain welders and only relented unper 
threat of court proceedings, was noted with a great amount of disapproval 
by the Court. 
The Court went on to suggest that refusal to employ a workman 
because he has worked on other projects in which there has been some 
industrial disruption is not legitimate hiring criteria for "a good 
unionist will and should go along with the decisions of his union, 
democratically made." However, if it was proved that the worker 
capriciously ignored the collective agreement or disturbed progress 
on the work site then this would be a ground for non-hiring. The 
decision clearly illustrates that the modern employee owes allegiances 
to bodies other than his immediate employer, and that, in the interests 
of industrial harmony, some concessions of management discretion is 
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warranted. 
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(C) The Right to Fire 
The right of management to unilaterally terminate an employment 
relationship is often regarded as the most fundamental of management's 
prerogatives and so the extent to which this 'right' exists in the 
present day is an indicator of the extent to which management rights 
as a whole retain their vitality. 
Under the common law, if an employer had been given due cause by 
a worker the worker may be dismissed without notice. Reasons include 
wilful disobediance of any lawful order by the employer, gross moral 
misconduct which is inconsistent with the contract of employment, 
negligence or malicious and damaging conduct in business, incompetence 
or permanent disability caused by illness. In addition, any worker can 
be dismissed, not necessarily for any reason, simply by giving the 
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required notice. A worker can take action against wrongful dismissal 
but is only able to recover damages equivalent to the wages that would 
have been earned during the period of notice, since the dismissal would 
have been lawful if notice had been given. Payment of wages in lieu 
of notice does not make a dismissal lawful but it precludes any action 
being taken. 
Obvio~sly, the employer in such a situation is in an omnipotent 
position, more so because the dismissed employee has no chance of 
obtaining an order of reinstatement because the doctrines concerning 
the equitable remedies of specific performance and injunction are 
rigorously opposed to the positive implementation of employment 
relationships. In response to this state of affairs and to comply with 
international standards, New Zealand has incorporated "unjustifiable 
dismissal" into the Personal Grievance procedure outlined ins. 117 
of the Industrial Relations Act. The procedure is not universal in 
its application: subject to subs. (3A) the grievance must be brought 
by the workers union on behalf of the worker; the worker must be a 
union member and must be covered by an award or collective agreement. 
The Arbitration Court may only investigate a matter under this section 
when the grievance machinery, outlined in subs (4) and implied by 
subs (2) and (3) into every award or collective agreement, has failed to 
settle the matter. 
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The key word ins. 117 is "unjustifiably" yet this is not defined 
in the Act, and the Arbitration Court has refrained from "laying down 
too early or too rigidly defined principles." 
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As far as claims 
of managerial prerogative are concerned, the Court has preferred not to 
articulate any notion of reserved managerial rights, or the absence of 
them. Instead, the Court has tended to see the unjustifiable dismissal 
jurisdiction as an extension of administrative law principles to private 
employment, tending to view the employer as an administrative agency 
over whom the Court has review powers comparable to those of the High 
Court (Administrative Division). The dismissal function is viewed as 
quasi-judicial, so the Court must see that the employer remains within 
his powers, does not abuse his powers and applies the principles of 
natural justice. 
The Courts emphasis has been on procedural fairness, rather than 
scrutinizing the decision itself. The judges have in effect worked out 
a six-fold classification of dismissal situations: (a) misconduct; 
(b) incompetence; ( c) ill health; (d) redundancy; (e) contravention 
of statute if the employment is continued; (f) a general residuary 
category. They have envisaged these situations as fundamentally different 
from one another, and have seen the demands of procedural justice as 
being of a .different kind in each case. For example, where employee 
misconduct is deteriorating a warning, preferrably written, is seen 
to be sensible, as ·procedural justice in these cases can be viewed as a 
trial process, and the procedural criteria applied are the principles 
of natural justice familiar to administrative lawyers generally. Thus 
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in cases of alleged theft and sexual harrassment where the police 
have been called in, the justice of the dismissal must be judged at 
the time the action was taken, and on the evidence brought before and 
relied on by the employer. Later discoveries may be relevant to 
questions of remedy but not to the justice of an action already taken. 
As a general rule however, it appears that in a dismissal situation an 
employer must ideally be able to show: 
(a) a systematic gathering of relevant facts, 
(b) a conscious process of assessment of those facts, 
(c) a consideration of the possibilities of alternative employment 
within the enterprise, and 
(d) consultation with the employee about the matter. 
' . 
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These demands of procedural justice place a heavy burden on the 
employer yet there are indications that the Court is beginning to 
concern itself with issues of substantive justice, especially in the 
areas of redundancy (see infra), whilst the occasional decision 
involving misconduct may be viewed as taking account of substantial 
notions of fairness. These d emands may be viewed as increasing the 
burden on the employer, that is, the employer will be seen as having 
dismissed the employee justifiably only if he both gave the employee 
the full benefits of fair procedure and accorded him his just deserts 
or established a functional necessity for dismissal. 
But, broadly speaking, the Arbitration Court has tended to pursue 
the ideal of rigorous professionalism in the matter of personnel 
management. It sees the imposition of high procedural standards as the 
means of improving the quality of employers' decisions; thus minimizing 
theirarbitrariness and thereby realizing the ideal of fairness. The 
one unjustifiable dismissal case to appear in the Court of Appeal has 
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upheld this approach. 
Although there is no statutory onus of proof, in principle the 
employer must prove the fairness of the dismissal on the balance of 
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• h I I pro a 1 1ties. In practice t e Court appears to vary the quantum 
of proof according to the nature of the case. That is, where the issue 
is viewed as having a high factual conte nt, with a corresponding increase 
in the employer's 'quantum' of proof, but where the dismissal is based 
upon the employer's operational requirements, managerial discretion will 
be perceived to predominate over factual content. The greater the 
employer's attention to correct procedure, the lower will be the 
perceived factual content of the issue, and hence the smaller the 
employer's burden of proof of facts. 
A brief mention on this issue must be made of victimization 
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proceedings brought under s. 150 of the Industrial Relations Act, and 
s. 15 of the Equal Pay Act, where there is a defence to show that the dismissal 
------~---~-~--·· 
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was due to some activity other than initiating proceedings under the 
legislation. As a matter of law, all the employer need prove is that 
he dismissed the worker, whether lawfully or not, for a reason 
independent of the worker's industrial action. There is a factually high 
presumption on the employer to discharge his burden, but the approach 
of the Court seems to be to focus on the employer's state of mind whereas 
in the unjustifiable dismissal area, it is on the nature of the act. 
Remedies ar~ prescribed bys. 117(7) of the Industrial Relations 
Act and include wage reimbursement and/or compensation and/or reinstatement. 
The latter remedy appears on its face to be highly provocative to an 
employer but the case law suggests that it is only practicable where 
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confidence in the employee has not been totally destroyed. Obviously 
the size of the enterprise and the potential hostility of the envirorunent 
are the most important factors to consider. The manner in which the 
dismissal was carried out is compensatable. 
The impact of the unjustifiable dismissal laws has clearly been 
to abrogate the previously unassailable free hand that management wielded. 
The law has forced management to adopt a pluralistic outlook; that they 
should not remorselessly pursue their own interests to the exclusion of 
'industrial justice'. Managers are encouraged to be better managers, 
with the obvious advantage going to larger firms with specialized 
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personnel function·s. Strangely though, a study based on the 
equivalent United Kingdom legislation in 1978 noted that the managers of 
smaller firms felt the least impact of the laws, probably reflecting the 
lower pervasiveness of Trade Union activity within the firm. Comments 
made to the study reflected a need to be aware of managerial responsibility 
by making managers more "people conscious" and inhibiting the worst 
excesses of personal eccentricity. It also seemed to encourage foreman 
discussions with personnel and higher management. On the negative side 
it was stated that some managers became more tolerant of poor performance 
and breaches of discipline. Management authority was often undermined, 
and the increased workload often proved irritating and inconvenient. 
An interesting insight is provided by a practitioner. Judith 
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Reid claims that the grievance procedure is only taken by middling to 
i • 
26 
weak unions who have no other recourse than the law. Militant unions 
who receive a complaint will first establish the extent of support for 
the dismissed worker and if it exists the worker will be reinstated "for 
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obvious reasons.' Often there is a six month delay before the case 
comes before the Arbitration Court and reinstatement is made more difficult 
as the employee is under duty to mitig~te damages, (that is, find 
another job). The question whether a dismissal is justifiable thus 
often turns on whether the issue is cost efficient to the union. An 
employee is able to take his grievance to the Arbitration Court and 
omit the usual procedure if the union, employer or any other person has 
failed to act, or act promptly (s. 117(3A) Industrial Relations Act) 
but this avenue is heavily slanted against the employee. He must prove 
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on the balance of probabilities of the failure to act , and hence 
must be convinced of, and able to persuade the Court to, the reasonableness 
of his case - all of which involves expense and practical difficulties 
if the employee is unaware both of why his union refused to handle the 
case or, indeed, why he was dismissed in the first place. 
Again, it must be reiterated that the unjustifiable dismissal 
procedure is only open to workers covered by an award and so excludes 
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57% of the workforce. There is a palpable incentive then for more 
workers to ,be drawn under the ambit of the state's umbrella, and to 
increase the state's control over smaller enterprises who appear to employ 
the majority of the 'unprotected' workforce. 
II! ' _________ _ 1·· 
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(D) Redundancy 
The management's decision on whether to instal new technology with 
consequent shedding of excess labour, or the closing down of an 
enterprise, or changing of methods or production, or any other sort of 
re-organisation that reduces the number of workers employed has still 
been upheld as definitely within the prerogative of management. This 
view was confirmed in a 1980 Arbitration Court decision where the issue was 
whether the establishment of new technology or new machinery which may 
result in fewer jobs is an "industrial matter" within the meaning of 
S. 2 of the Industrial Relations Act. After examining a number of 
Australian and New Zealand decisions on the narrow point of "industrial 
matter" the Court by majority held "that the introduction of new 
machinery or method into a work place is a decision for the employer and 
not regarded as being subject to collective bargaining". 
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Consultation 
with the union was highly advised. 
Avoidance of redundancy is the most difficult issue as economic 
necessity on the employer's part has always been recognized as a 
legitimate reason for terminating employment. As a general rule, once a 
genuine and objectively palpable decision has been made, for instance 
by referring to past trading losses, the Court will not look into 
employer policy decisions as to who or how many fall victim to retrench-
ment policies. Th.e principle of "last on, first off" is to be generally 
followed, but is not an overriding consideration as against the need, say, 
to maintain an efficient workforce. The Courts have defined their task 
as to find "a genuine reorganization and not some trumped up excuse to 
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dress up financial stringency in the form of redundancy" and has led 
the Court to decide on one occasion that an alleged r e dundancy was brought · 
b f 1 · 
57 d · h 1 f h a out by a lack o panning , an in other, waste resu to t e 
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proprietor's conduct leading to the business running out of work , and that 
what r eally occured we re unjustifiable dismissals. This general trend 
may be viewed as a serious encroachment on management rights for there 
now appears to be a rebuttable presumption emerging that an alleged 
redundancy resulting in dismissals is not strictly within the purview 
of the employer. 
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The issue was mentioned in Canterbury H:)tel ... etc IUW v. Fabiola 
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Fashions Ltd where the Court held that it was entitled to ask 
whether "the decision was one which a competent businessman might 
reasonably have made." The decision need not be the best one, the Court 
concedes, but it must not be unreasonable in the circumstances. The 
Court granted itself licence to investigate the company, its policies 
and practices, and to overturn a management decision and brings. 117 
remedies into play (supra). This may include reinstatement, as a recent 
case displayed che Court willing to reinstate an unjustifiably 
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dismissed employee to what it regarded as her previous 'temporary' 
position as it was satisfied therewas . sufficient work available to so 
warrant it. 
It is clear that though not an "industrial matter" at the policy 
stage, once jobs are lost it becomes one. It places a premium on 
management to fulfill the corporatist ideal. It places a strong 
incentive on consultation with unions over redundancy matters to avoid 
an open airing of its work site policy. 
Nevertheless the Court upholds managerial prerogative with respect 
to the issue of compensation for redundancy. In Cornhill Insurance 
Company v New Zealand Insurance Guild 
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the Arbitration Court held that 
if an award imposes no obligation to pay redundancy pay "there is no 
jurisdiction to enquire into the merits or otherwise of a failure to 
reach an agreement on redundancy, nor to make an award in this respect, 
nor to order the parties to continue consulting until agreement is 
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reached". In doing so it ignores an argument put by D. Mathieson that 
the inclusion of a term in a contract providing for redundancy payments 
may in any case not be valid because the obligation to perform arises 
when the contract has been terminated. Fortunately, for the Court, there 
has not been a case on point, and it is unlikely there ever will be, 
especially with the spectre of the Mangere Bridge Dispute, the longest 
running dispute in New Zealand industrial history, which was fought on 
the issue of redundancy agreements,in the back of employers' minds. 
Respective union - employer power relationships and the quality of 
dialogue between the groups will dictate to what extent management rights 
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in this area will remain extant. 
63 c. Taylor postulates that 
powerful unions prefer not to have full redundancy agreements in an 
award so that they can assess the employer 's situation at the time of 
the redundancy - the old maxim being "the minimum becomes the maximum". 
Ultimately, the increasing number of redundancy situations occurring 
in the country, and the size of some redundancy payments (for example 
$2 million at Mosgiel in 1981) may necessitate legislative intervention 
similar to the Redundancy Act (UK). The only positive action in the 
area to date has been to make redundancy payments no longer deductible 
from unemployment benefits, thus taking pressure off the need to 
increase the scale of payments. The Severance and Re-Employment Bill, 
first introduced in 1975 has lately re-emerged before Parliament. 
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(E) Right to Suspend Workers 
As a general rule, the Court, under the personal grievance 
procedures of s. 117 of the Industrial Relations Act, is not concerned 
with disciplinary proceedings, except and insofar as the administrative 
duties imposed by the award or agreement are adhered to. The Court 
has been loathe, however, to create a right of suspension without pay, 
though suspension with pay is recommended as an interim measure where 
investigations of employee dishonesty are being carried out. 
There is however, ins. 128(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 
which provides that where there is a strike, and as a result of the 
strike any employer is unable to provide for any of his non striking 
workers, work that is normally performed by the workers, the employer 
may suspend their employment without pay, until the strike is ended. 
In Elston v State Services Commission (No. 3) 
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it was warned that the 
relevant instrument must precisely define the nature and limits of the 
right, the preconditions so set out must be rigidly adhered to, and 
a requisite warning should be given when all pre-conditions are 
satisfied, but before actual suspension takes place. The evidential 
onus is on the employer to show that available work was insufficient 
to keep h1s workers in employment but this should not be difficult to 
discharge since the facts relating to the employer's operation would be 
mainly within the knowledge of the employer. 
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(F) The Right to Manage and Employee's Due Process 
Rights 
Employer estimates suggest that as much as 20% of t
otal compensation 
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costs derive from benefits and allowances not speci
fied in awards yet 
the infrequent use of the procedure outlined ins. 
117 of the Industrial 
Relations Act for actions of an employer that "disad
vantage" the 
employee suggests that management have been granted
 an unchallenged 
hand in areas where some limitation would be approp
riate. For example, 
there have been very few challenges to the reasonab
leness of rules. 
Absenteeism control programmes unilaterally initiate
d by an employer , 
or the search of a person or personal property on th
e employer ' s 
premises have also gone unchallenged under s . 117. 
The Arbitration Court has purposely avoided entangl
ing itself in 
promotion matters, wisely being wary of it ending u
p as a selection 
conunittee. However, it has shown its capability to
 interfere in other 
areas. A pertinent example is New Zealand Airline 
Pilots Association IUW 
v Air New Zealand where an international pilot who 
had previously 
voluntarily sought treatment for an alcohol problem
 was required to 
sign an undertaking to sununarily terminate his empl
oyment in the event 
of his resuming his drinking habits. He was suspen
ded from employment 
after refusing to sign it as well as a slightly ame
nded version. The 
Court, after being given evidence of an American sch
eme where pilots were 
reinstated after undergoing treatment for alcoholism
 considered that the 
undertaking was too harsh, and ordered reinstatemen
t subject to the pilot 
undergoing some professional treatment and his unde
rtaking to notify the 
company of any alcohol consumption. 
It is not contrary to management rights to ensure a 
worker's due 
process rights for the alternative would be increase
d worker dissatis-
faction manifested in work stoppages and low produc
tivity. Consequences 
also spread throughout the economy. For instance, 
it has been 
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conservatively estimated in The Employer that 5% 
of employees have 
alcohol and drug problems similar to the Air New Ze
aland pilot, costing 
the economy, in 1981, some $100 million and so the 
Court's decision may be 
an expression of corporatist policy to attempt a re
habilitative ideal 
starting from within tbe individual firm. 
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(G) The Right to Manage and the Employees Duty of Loyalty 
In the U.S.A., there has emerged what is known as a 'whistle 
blower' who is described as a "muckraker from within, who exposes 
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what he considers the unconscionable practices of his own organisation." 
Having decided at some point that the actions of the organisation 
are immoral, illegal, or inefficient, he acts on that belief by 
informing legal authorities or others outside the organisation. This 
'right' is obviously very different from the traditional role of the 
employee whose pre-eminent virtue is loyalty to his master. Whilst 
those in management see the genre as contrary to the unifying value of 
co-operative effort , other theorists stress the idea that employees 
in a free society should not be obligated to restrict their loyalty 
to only one institution or cause. It is one thing to expect employees 
to commit themselves to pursuing broad organisational objectives; it 
is quite another to see the contract of employment as a "Faustian 
bargain in which employees suspend all critical judgrnent to serve 
h 
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t e1r superiors. 
The action of Breach of Confidence may be relied on by the employer 
to protect confidential information in an employment situation, though 
the employer must come to court with clean hands for "there is no 
confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity." However, case law in 
the area suggests the Courts are willing to allow disclosure if it is 
in the public interest. In Woodward v Hutchins 
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it was held that if 
a group of entertainers seek publicity over certain facts, which is to 
their advantage, they cannot complain if an employee afterwards discloses 
the truth about those facts. Unsupported dicta of Lord Salmon in the 
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case of British Steel Corporation v Granada Television suggests that 
where a public corporation is in a financially parlous condition and 
shareholders are unable to hold investigations, the corporation is fair 
game for an employee who comes across any information to expose it 
publicly. Both cases cited are recent and have only indirect application 
in the employment field, though they instruct employers that harmonious 
work relations may be achieved by tempering profit maximization in favour 
of keeping communication and grievance procedures open to all employees. 
'Whistle Blowing' is often a manifestation of management not being 
willing to entertain their employee 's grievances at an early stage. 
33 
(H) The Right to Manage and Women 
The Maternity Leave and Employment Protection Act 1980 provides 
that a pregnant employee who at the expected date of delivery has been 
employed by the same employer for the preceding 18 months (for at 
least 15 hours a week) is entitled to 26 weeks maternity leave from 
the date of confineme nt or from a date not more than 6 weeks before 
the expected date of delivery or earlier if medically advised. There 
is a presumption that the position can be kept open until the end of 
the leave and the burden of proof to the contrary lies on the employer. 
If the employer cannot guarantee the job on her return, he is bound 
to give the employee preference for any alternative employment that 
occurs. 
The practical effect of such legislation on management was subject 
to a survey of the equivalent English legislation,the Employment 
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Protection Consolidation Act 1978 (UK). Caution must of course be 
expressed about transferring data across cultures, yet the English 
legislation appears to be more onerous than the New Zealand Act (for 
example by authorizing payment to the employee by her employer during 
her absence) and this, it is submitted would counteract much of the 
bias. Significantly,93% of those surveyed said that no changes had 
been made ' in their establishments because of the legislation and of the 
remaining 7%, such changes that did occur involved provision of 
information of staff rights, pension scheme modification, or simply 
more interest being taken in pregnant employees. The evidence did not 
support the contention that employers were reluctant to hire women of 
childbearing age, in any case, no more than a certain reluctance in 
particular fields of work that occured even before the legislation. 
Reinstatement mostly provided problems in jobs where there are specialized 
skills and specific knowledge of workplace operations. Few women are in 
positions of this sort and those that are are not usually of childbearing 
age. The Act therefore appears to be ineffectual in its practical 
application. 
In the same substantial situation is the Equal Pay Act 1972, 
the underlying principle of which is that employees of either sex should 
receive the same rate of remuneration for the same, or substantially 
,. 
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similar work. But the Act can only apply to women who are exactly 
like men and can replace men on the job, and only to those women 
who are exactly as deserving as men receive their due to the same 
extent as men. The fact that in February 1982 the average female's 
gross weekly wage was 73% of her male counterpart 
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illustrates 
that parity will be almost impossible to enforce because sexes tend 
to be employed in particular industries (for example, few men are 
employed in the clothing industry whilst few women are involved in 
heavy industry), and no case has been brought before the Court to 
test inter-industry parities. The Act may be beneficial to professional 
women, but these are comparative ly few in number and there has been 
a customary tendency to grant equal remuneration in any case. Those 
in the Government service have had equal pay since 1960 and benefit 
from rigid classification and status guidelines and rules to enforce 
their status. 
,. 
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(I) Hours of Work 
Hours of work and related questions are heavily prescribed by 
l egislation . The Industrial Relations Act provides that in every 
award the Arbitration Court shall fix at not more than 40 hours 
maximum number of hours to be worked in any week by any worker bound 
by the award. Overtime is excluded from the maximum. The Court, 
however , has the discretion to decide whether normal working hours 
are impracticable in any particular industry. Workers in industries 
where 'irregular' hours are the norm are covered by special legislation, 
for example the NursesAct 1977, or have d e viations in the hours 
incorporated in their award, for example , the New Zealand Musicians 
75 
Award. In addition, the Arbitration Court has the power to extend 
work beyond ordinary hours, in other word~ overtime. Collective 
instruments merely provide for overtime payment , but do not make the 
working of overtime compulsory either for the employer or the worker. 
Through this framework, the manager is left with considerable 
scope to negotiate hours of employment with the relevant unions. 
Two cases illustrate the Arbitration Court's interpretation of management 
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rights in this area. In Woolworths (NZ) Ltd v Shop Employees IUW 
the employer proposed to be open for two late nights a week. The award 
declared that staff could be directed to work one late night a week. 
The Court, interpreted a proviso added to it as entitling the employer 
to employ staff on a second late night in each week subject to the 
consent of the workers concerned. The employer was entitled to operate 
on that second optional night, notwithstanding that workers voluntarily 
refused the offer of voluntary overtime. If all existing workers 
individually declined the option the employer had the right to open the 
shop engaging new staff for the purpose. 
The Courts position was left in no doubt by the New Zealand 
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(except Canterbury and Westland) Electrical etc IUW v NZ Steel Ltd. 
The affirmative language used by the Court was that "the employer always 
has the right to manage [underlining was by the Court) unless the 
collective agreement clearly specifies otherwise." In that case the 
right to change rosters was debated, the Court holding that the right is 
solely the employer's if the nature of the operations requires changes 
or makes them desirable. 
1 • 
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Both cases neatly illustrate the Court's reluctance to intervene 
in what is essentially decisions affecting the welfare of the 
enterprise. Limits, if any, should be arrived at in negotiation with 
the unions . The only derogation of the principle is that changes should 
be made with reasonable notice given by the employer. 
________________ ,·
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(J) Safety, Health and Welfare 
An employer must take reasonable care to provide and maintain a 
reasonably safe place of work, plant, and equipment, appliances and 
tools, and carry out the production process in a way which minimizes 
risks and the possibility of injury. At common law, the employer ~snot 
required to provide a watertight protection system, merely to exercise 
the standard of care of an ordinary, prudent employer , and guard against 
abnormal risks according to the custom in that particular industry. 
In contrast, legislation, for example, The Factory Act, Boilers Lifts 
and Cranes Act, Machinery Act, Mining Act, impose an absolute statutory 
duty on the employer to ensure actual safety. As a rule, legislation 
is enforced by penal sanctions, and it is clear that an action for 
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breach of statutory duty may be brought under them. 
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0. Kahn-Freund states that such legislation serves a "creative 
function" operating through the law of tort emphasising that the 
employer is only the controller of material and not human resources. 
The question of management rights is neatly sidestepped by imposing 
the duties on the employer, not as a party to the contract, but as an 
occupier of the premises. Minimum standards can then be maintained 
without any necessary reference to an employment relationship. Beyond 
that minimum however, the discretion lies purely with the employer and 
his sense of morality and industrial relations. In 1980, 58 of the 352 
total stoppages concerned conditions of work, involving 17,587 workers 
and the loss of 33,104 working days suggesting that it is in the 
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employer's best interests to create a safe place to work. 
A novel corporatist intrusion in this area is provided by ss 38-46, 
57 of the Accident Compensation Act 1982. Every employer is 
required to pay a levy calculated as a percentage of income earned 
by his employees. If an employee is injured in the course of his 
employment, the employer must compensate the employee with 80% of 
earnings in respect of total time lost during the first week of his 
incapacity, after which the Accident Compensation Corporation takes 
over responsibility for compensation. An accident arising out of an 
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employee ignoring or disobeying a legal regulation or a specific 
warning or instruction about the correct method of doing his job would 
not remove the employer's liability. Themde rly ing philosophy 
recognizes that because management seek merely to minimize costs in 
complying with legislative standards they pay little atte ntion to the 
wider social costs of injury. The Accident Compe nsation Scheme (and 
its Worker Compensation predecessor) attempts to internalize these 
social costs after an injury has occured, to thus give greater 
incentive for management to responsibly exercise rights by making job 
safety, training and dissemination of information a matter of self 
interest. 
, · 
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(K) The Employees Right to Work 
Opponents of management rights claim that even if management 
have a property interest in both the capital assets of the enterprise 
as well as its flow of income, it is argued that workers equally have 
a property interest in their labours and thus the property interest, 
of management should be accorded no special status. The aforementioned 
minimum standards of employment imply that a job is a valuable asset, 
not only to the employer as an element of his factors of production, 
but, more obviously, to the individual employee. The essential elements 
of life and status within our capitalist society are all dependant 
on ability to d e rive income. C. Reich 
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goes further to suggest 
that " ... the protection of this means of livelihood from confiscation 
or encroachment appears as fundame ntal a basis of the social order as 
it does to the owners of the land. What both parties claim is security 
and continuity of livelihood - that maintenance of the 'establishe d 
expectation' which is the 'condition precedent' of civilized life." 
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In support of this claim is a quote by Lord Denning in Edwards v SOGAT. 
that a "right to work" is "now fully recognized by the law." (This 
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is in comparison to Lord ['a,vey' s classic dictum in Allen v Flood 
that "A man has no right to be employed by any particular employer and 
has no right to any particular employment if it depends on the will 
of another. ") It may then be claimed that the modern worke r has a 
countervailing property interest. 
This argument is fallacious for two reasons. Firstly, Lord Denning's 
decision in Edwards v _§OGAT ( supra) was based on a narrower proposition 
that a union hasr.oright to expel even a temporary worker arbitrarily, 
and his wider dicta has received no judicial support in England. Secondly, 
in many modern, capital-intensive industries the quantitative 
importance of labour is outweighed by capital invested. 
A more supportable proposition is the "right to be given work" 
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despite the well established rule, as reiterated in Langston v AUEW (No.2) 
that the ordinary employee has no right to insist on being given work 
within the scope of his general duties which he finds most satisfying. 
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Halsbury's Laws of England states "It now seems probable that all contracts 
of employment by implication give to the employee the right not merely 
to be paid his agreed wage, but also the right to have his work when it 
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is available." Such an approach can be justified by an implied term 
in the contract of service. 
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This view has not found much academic approval. Implications 
of terms into contracts is to a great extent determined by changing 
social and industrial standards, and the obvious difficulty is an 
evidential one of such changes; usually the basis is the normal practice 
of employers and employees. Moreover evidence must be tangible, for 
example, unsupported dicta by Lord Denning in the Langston case relied 
on Paragraph 9 of the Code of Practice (UK) which urges recognition of 
"the employees need to achieve a sense of satisfaction in the job." 
The English Courts, on the whole, have showed an unwillingness to make 
such a difficult value judgment. 
There are exceptions: where the nature of the contract is such that 
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the employee expects to seek enhancement of reputation or publicity, 
where the employee is paid partly or wholly by conunission, or, by analogy, 
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on a piece work basis, where the contract contemplates appointment to 
a specifi~d office for the entirety of the contract and, more dubiously, 
where there is an obligation to provide a reasonable amount of work for 
him to develop and enhance his skills. 
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However, it is unlikely that 
there will be a complete extention of the right for it would impinge on 
industrial re-organization and mobility, policy considerations generally 
upheld by the Courts. 
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(L) Industrial Democracy 
The lynch-pin of expressions of management pre rogative s is a theme 
of authoritarianism, and a siege -mentality that awaits inevitable 
conflict which s e ek to limit the pre rogative. It leads to self-fulfilling 
stereotypes whe re manageme nt behaves in one particular way, employees 
in another and 'hever the twain shall meet". Howe ve r, with changing 
social and technological conditions and attitude s, many industrialised 
countries have experimente d with arrangements by which employees 
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contribute to the functioning of the organi s ation within which they work. 
An attempt to gauge New Ze aland involvement in this generalized trend was 
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attempted by the De partment of Labour who in 1973 surve y e d over 2000 
firms employing 20 or more people to asce rtain the level of worker 
participation in the company and wha t forms it took. Only 12.5% of the 
firms indicated they operated some kind of worke r participation of 
the following forms: 
(i) Joint Consultation A mode for bring ing emp loyers and emp loye es 
together to discuss topics of mutual inte r e st. (60% of the 
instances of participation involve d this c ate gory, e ither by itse lf 
or in association with some othe r scheme .) 
(ii) Autonomous or Semi-Autonomous Wo rk Groups Within a pre-de t e rmine d 
production plan the e mployee s work out the d e tail as to how a 
particular job will be performe d. (24 %). 
(iii) Profit Sharing Unde r a pre-de t e rmine d agreement employees who 
satisfy age or service relate d qualifications share in the net 
profits of the employer company. ( 15 % ) • 
(iv) Employee Shareholding These may be labour shares, which have 
nominal value but p e rmit holders to atte nd shareholde rs meetings 
and share in canpany profits, or tradeable shares where employee s 
are provided with the opportunity to purchase or be allocated 
shares in their company. ( 2 0%) • 
92 . 1 . d . t A follow-up in 1976 discove red that consu tation was pre ominan 
in larger firms where the need for formal consultation was held to be 
greater than small concerns where more informal avenues of communication 
existed. Autonomous work groups usually were found in firms with less 
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than 100 employees, while the other two categories were found mainly 
in medium to large concerns. 
The researchers conunented that the majority of the firms involved 
were progressive in their approach to economic welfare. This was 
correlated with safety training and a package of welfare benefits a.pd 
accorded with managers' views of seeing the industrial democracy issue 
as central in maintaining or improving industrial relations. Interestingly, 
41% of the schemes were introduced without officially notifying the 
union. However, the study found that company finance and policy, and 
award matters and personal subjects relating to individuals were usually 
excluded from discussion. Most autonomous work groups had limited 
authority to make decisions, management being responsible for setting 
production targets. 
Several factors contribute to the slow development of industrial 
democracy in New Zealand. A ready access to conciliation and arbitration 
has atrophied employer readiness to negotiate with unions. More 
importantly, and especially since New Zealand has relied extensively on 
legislation for the creation and upkeep of its industrial relations, the 
Legislature has not been vocal in the area. It was only in the 1975 
election that both political parties mentioned the subject in their 
election manifestos, yet till 1978 the National Party only instigated minor 
legislative amendments to existing profitsharing schemes . Section 233 (1) (a) 
of the Industrial Relations Act which empowers the Governor-General to 
"provide for the voluntary establishment of works conunittees representative 
of workers and employers, in order to promote and maintain harmonious 
industrial relations, at the level of the individual undertaking" goes no 
way to implementing a statutory requirement of worker participation 
assessed by a pre-determined ratio of workers to management in the 
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boardroom, as reconunended by the Bullock Report, and appears trivial 
compared to comprehensive participation principles enunciated in the 
West German Co-Determination Act 1951 and the Constitution Act 1952. 
Attitudinal barriers present the greatest stumbling block. Legal 
orthodoxy finds it difficult to forget the duty of the servant to obey 
his master, and social orthodoxy that workers and managers belong to 
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different worlds. Often asserted by manage rs is that employees do not 
want a management role as it could alienate workers who, with good 
reason, fail to unde rstand it, ' for the suspicion may grow that b e hind all 
the complexities of a new power block, made up of managers, shareholders, 
a workers elite will be created. Unions themselves are naturally 
cautious of employer motives in instituting participation schemes. 
Historically, their greatest gains have been made in confrontation, 
rather than co-operation, with management, and there is the fear that, 
where situations such as a redundancy arise, worker representatives who 
would probably be senior employees and thus less susceptible to being 
laid-off, would support management policy, or at least, be indecisive 
as to where loyalties would lie. 
It seems then that deep seated beliefs and mutual mistrust will 
hinder any further development in this area. A bookle t publishe d 
h 1 d · 
94 · · h . ld byte Emp oyers Fe eration enshrines the view tat the issue shou 
be seen in terms of employee involvement rather than worker particip ation. 
It emphasises means for promoting greater employee invovlement and 
identification with his/her company. Here the main thrusts are see n 
in better communications (with special emp h a sis on joint consultation) 
and direct schemes designed to improve job satisfaction, encourage 
involveme~t in job restructuring and acceptance of a wide r span of 
responsibility. Matters normally subject to collective bargaining, 
selection procedures, promotion procedures and personal grievances are 
held to be unsuitable for joint consultatio n. Direct bargaining outside 
formal structures is the best proponents of industrial democracy can 
currently look to to achieve the ir goals. 
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CONCLUSION 
The management rights investigated are not exhaustive, and
, in any 
case, it would be impractical to delineate all rights for 
they change 
with, or are modified by, changing social and technologic
al conditions.
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For a right to be valid it is submitted it must satisfy th
e following 
requisites: 
(1) The right must be reasonable; 
(2) The right must be clear and unequivocal; 
(3) The right must be brought to the attention of the emp
loyee if it 
is not a recognized custom, before the company can act on 
it; 
(4) The employee must be aware of the consequences of ign
oring the right; 
(5) The right must be exercised consistently; 
(6) The right must be capable of forming the subject matt
er of 
union-management negotiation; 
(7) The right must be consistent with legislation. 
The last requisite is, of course, the most important, beca
use 
within the corporatist scheme any right that does not fit 
with or is 
inadequate to promote state interests, is modifiable by st
atute. 
Conversely, a right can be created or a recognized right e
ncapsulated 
by statute though this is rare, an exception beings. 32 o
f the Maternity 
Leave and Employment Protection Act which states - "Nothin
g in this Act 
shall affect any right of an employer to dismiss ... " 
Underlying the expression of management rights is a power 
substrata 
that governs particular industries and is often not manife
sted in tangible 
ways. Powerful unions may force management to negotiate a
way a substantial 
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proportion of their rights or, more usually a powerful 
management 
structure faced by a patchwork of disjointed unions may un
ilaterally 
claim dictorial powers. Even the most diligent shop stewa
rd or factory 
inspector can do little if no one complains. 
Similarly, if the employer occupies an important niche in 
the 
economic structure the state may intervene to
 uphold what it 
considers important rights in the public interest, notably
 the right to 
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bargain if a powerful union renders any wage s
ettlement involuntary. 
This can be justified at two levels. Firstly,
 the state in its role 
as trustee of the country's economic well-bein
g must limit any 
destabilizing influences which may threaten st
ability. Secondly, 
since the state has a quasi-property interest 
in a company, logically, 
it is both the state and management who claim 
a right to manage, the 
latter by its historic ideology, the former by
 its "new property" 
interests. It is not inconsistent then if only 
one "partner" has the 
moral and political power to enforce the right
, since the right accrues 
to management as a whole. 
Inevitably, employment related legislation wil
l be hinged upon the 
conception as to the position that a party is 
to occupy in the economic 
and social structure. It is in the interests 
of the state and of 
industrial harmony that a strict divide must b
e maintained between 
employers and employees, and with it a permiss
ible set of behaviours 
ascribed to each. These behaviours may be pre
scribed by legislation 
conducive to the general aim but if this legis
lation lacks practical 
application it does not derogate from the inte
ntion behind it. It must 
accept the difficulty of manipulating age-old 
attitudes and behaviours, 
and endeavour to change them by education or b
y appealing to notions of 
self-interest rather than by direct coercion. 
The Common Law incidents of the right to manag
e have therefore given 
way to a status created by and supported by th
e state. The unitary 
ideology that espoused the notion that workers
' well-being would be 
guaranteed by following the management plan -
the result of a historical 
empirical growth - has been modified along wit
h the basic assumptions of 
property that legitimized it. 
97 
The result is an "ideology of no ideology 
the notion of an "average" manager who pragma
tically justifies his 
'right to manage' within a corporalist framewo
rk and who exercises it in 
a capitalistic - authoritarian, but reasonable
 manner. 
J 
(b 
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Consequently, the proposition posed at the introduction of this 
paper may be answered with a qualified affirmative. Qualified, because 
at the rhetorical level, if collective bargaining is admissible in 
certain aspects of management then it is difficult to justify, on the 
grounds of incursion on the legal rights of owners, its exclusion 
from any aspect of management. Ultimately, however, management authority 
will be justified on functional grounds. If sharing of responsibility 
with employees, co-operating with trade unions, entering into 
collective bargaining and collective agreements are necessary in order 
that the organisation can pursue its objectives, then sharing of 
responsibility, co-operating with unions and bargaining become integral, 
parts of the management function. 
In any organisation someone has to decide what to do, how it is 
to be done and ensure that it is done. The practical necessity of 
this management function remains no matter what the nature of the 
corporatist legal framework, the extent of the divorce between ownership 
and control, or the social,economic or political system within which the 
organisation exists. 
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